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Too Far Apart: Repeal The War Powers
Resolution
MICHAEL J. GLENNON*
[W]ith your opening remarks about war powers, we may not be that
far apart.
-Ambassador Madeleine Albright to Senator Jesse Helms'
Thirty-five years ago, one of the constitutional scholars who partic-
ipated in the drafting of the War Powers Resolution,2 Alexander Bickel,
wrote: "[T]he Court should declare as law only such principles as
will-in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future-gain gen-
eral assent."3 The same, I should think, ought apply equally to Con-
gress: Congress should declare as law rules that will be followed.
Enacted in 1973 to help ensure a true partnership between Congress and
the Executive in the decision to use armed force, the War Powers Reso-
lution has not succeeded at that task, and in failing to gain general assent
the Resolution has become a monument to the ignorability of a law dis-
liked. It can be made to work as it was intended to work; I have sug-
gested elsewhere how it might be fixed.4 But in the political climate
prevailing today, twenty years after the fall of Saigon, it will not be
* Copyright © 1995 Michael J. Glennon. Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, Law School. I am grateful to John A. Leman for research assistance.
1. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the Contract with America Defense
Policy Provisions, Federal News Service, March 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. The two continued:
Sen. Helms: Now you are going on record right now as favoring the repeal for
War Powers Act, is that correct?
Amb. Albright: Well we have always-in every administration there have
been issues between the executive and legislative branch on war powers. We want
to work with you and Congress on this particular issue. I think on the specifics of
this you need to talk to the lawyers in the administration. My own sense is that we
feel, as other administrations have, about war powers.
Sen. Helms: So that says that for your part that you would favor a repeal of the
War Powers Act?
Amb. Albright: Yes.
Sen. Helms: Speaking for yourself?
Amb. Albright: Yes, speaking for myself.
Id. She continued, offering clarification: "What I'd like to say, in terms of the administration, is
that I specifically am not calling for its repeal. I think that what we need is flexibility within it."
Id.
2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
3. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 239 (2d ed., Yale University Press
1986).
4. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 111-18 (1990).
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fixed, and there is no indication that the climate is about to change any
time soon. Therefore, except for a fairly minor provision, the War Pow-
ers Resolution should be repealed.
I.
The War Powers Resolution has failed largely because its framers
presupposed a political context radically different from that in which the
Resolution has operated. The Resolution emerged from an aberrational
political climate in 1973, and that climate was wrongly assumed to rep-
resent a sea-change in congressional-executive relations that would exist
for years to come. Among the many strange ideas people had in the
"Sixties" was the idea that the era would go on forever. Many of the
new political activists of those years had never really seen political
change before, and there seemed no reason to believe that it would not
be permanent. The Sixties did go on, through Nixon's 1974 resignation,
and perhaps through the 1975 Church Committee hearings on intelli-
gence abuses. But, as the 1970s wound down, the Sixties petered out,
and when they came to an end, so too did the public outrage that led to
laws like the War Powers Resolution. When the political climate that
spawned such laws dissipated, so too did the will to enforce them.
Those were heady times for supporters of a congressional reclama-
tion of power. I recall walking back to the Dirksen building from the
Senate Chamber on the warm November night in 1973 when the Senate
overrode President Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution. The
Senator with whom I walked-a liberal Democrat who was one of the
Resolution's sponsors-said over and over, "Boy, we sure stuck it to
Nixon."' 5 The "Saturday Night Massacre" (in which Nixon fired Water-
gate special prosecutor Archibald Cox) occurred only three weeks ear-
lier, and a whiff of "payback time" was in the air. Arthur Schlesinger's
The Imperial Presidency, published that year, was seen by many in Con-
gress as identifying the core of the nation's problems. The Senate's
Ervin Committee delved into Watergate during the summer of 1973 and,
against the backdrop of an increasingly unpopular President, Congress
proceeded to put an end to American involvement in the Vietnam war,
to reassert its power over the purse in the Congressional Budget and
5. In a sense, Congress did indeed "stick it to Nixon," but Congress did little to change the
way America makes war. As Professor Ely notes, after realizing Congress had dodged its
constitutional duties since 1950, it "decided it could not count on itself to decide [issues involving
the use of force] unless forced to, and enacted, over President Nixon's veto, the War Powers
Resolution of 1973." JOHN H. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILiTY 48 (1993). But, as the history of
the War Powers Resolution amply demonstrates, Congress seriously underestimated its own
ability to avoid making tough decisions.
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Impoundment Control Act,6 and, for the first time in history, to force a
President from office. The times, it seemed, had changed. And many
thought the times would remain changed.
But, of course, they did not. Less than two years after the enact-
ment of the War Powers Resolution, President Ford directed military
operations incident to the evacuation of South Vietnam that ran counter
to seven different statutory funding prohibitions enacted during prior
years to end American involvement in the war.7 Members of Congress
who had sponsored and voted for the Resolution, when faced with public
support for the President's actions, said nothing.8 And though no Presi-
dent has ever clearly violated the sixty-day time limit, such is the pattern
that has persisted to this day. When confronting a popular military initi-
ative, members of Congress are loathe to criticize procedure for fear of
being seen as criticizing substance, and-remembering Vietnam-few
are willing to run the risk of being caught on the wrong side of a debate
on use of force.9 The late Senator Frank Church, a sponsor of the Reso-
lution, said it well: "[I]f the President, as Commander-in-Chief, uses the
Armed Forces in an action that is both swift and successful, then there is
little reason to expect the Congress to do anything but applaud."' 1
Since the high-water mark of congressional activism during which
the Resolution was adopted, members of Congress have increasingly
come to eschew controversial votes. Kent Weaver of the Brookings
Institution has characterized this as "credit claiming" and "blame avoid-
ing" behavior," and it has come to pervade vast stretches of legislative
6. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297.
7. President Ford, however, did not violate the War Powers Resolution; he filed a report, and
concluded the operation within 60 days. Ford cited § 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution when
he reported the operation to evacuate Danang and the operation to evacuate Cambodia. Thomas
M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic Invocation "?, 83 Am. J. INT'L
L. 766, 769 n.13 (1989). Ford "t[ook] note" of § 4(a)(1) when he reported the Mayaguez rescue.
Id.
8. As Professor Ely concludes from his survey of Congress' role in the Vietnam War,
"Congress is reluctant, by whatever means, to refuse to fight a war the president has indicated he
wants, particularly (though I think this factor may also tend to be overrated) one he has already
begun." ELY, supra note 5, at 29.
9. Professor Ely characterizes the post-World War II consensus this way:
During that period a tacit deal has existed between the executive and legislative
branches, not just with respect to foreign policy but more generally, to the effect that
the president will take the responsibility (well, most of it) so long as he can make
the decisions, and Congress will forego actual policy-making authority so long as it
doesn't have to be held accountable (and can scold the president when things go
wrong).
ELY, supra note 5, at 54.
10. A Review of the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution: Hearings
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1977).
11. R. KENT WEAVER, AUTOMATIC GOVERNMENT: THE POLITICS OF INDEXATION 18-19
(1988).
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
terrain beyond the war power: base-closing, interest rate regulation, and
budget cuts have all been assigned to entities removed from the political
process.12 The problem in recent years has been less and less an impe-
rial presidency and more and more a monarchical legislature-a Con-
gress whose members seek the trappings of office but flee from their
traditional decision-making responsibilities.13 It is said to many new
members of Congress that no one will ever regret a speech that one
never gives; the same can be said for a vote that one never casts. The
upshot, increasingly, is legislative autopilot, a process through which
credit can be claimed but blame avoided. As Senator Robert Byrd has
candidly said, "It is not just that the President is often reluctant to con-
sult, but it is always the case that if we are honest with ourselves, we
here sometimes do not want early responsibility."'
14
As generals supposedly always refight the last war, so too does
Congress. Its members myopically assumed in 1973 that future war
powers disputes would involve Vietnam-like scenarios, where massive
American troop buildups occurred over a graduated period following an
identifiable blowup or flash point of the sort that supposedly occurred in
the Gulf of Tonkin. Accordingly, the Resolution requires the President
to report within forty-eight hours and to withdraw the forces from those
hostilities within sixty days.' 5 But specific, identifiable flash points
often don't occur, and when they do, the resulting hostilities normally
don't last for sixty days. Thus, on a macro level, the War Powers Reso-
lution presupposes a conflict model that is only one of many possibilities
that have been multiplied in number by modem military technology. On
a micro level, this erroneous assumption has been magnified by ambigu-
12. I do not disparage the effectiveness of their work: the Federal Reserve Board and Base
Closing Commission probably have been among the most successful of Congress's creatures in
recent years. The point is simply that they do the work and take the heat-not Congress. See id.
Professor Ely points out that the War Powers Resolution, while similar to laws such as the
Graham-Rudman-Hollings Budget Control Act because it is "designed to force a decision
regarding matters that Congress has in the past shown itself unwilling to face up to," is different
because the War Powers Resolution "does not push the tough decisions onto somebody else (such
as the Comptroller General)." ELY, supra note 5, at 48. Of course, in practice, Congress has in
fact shifted the responsibility for tough decisions to someone else-the President.
13. Indeed, as Prof. Ely points out in War and Responsibility:
Throughout the Indochina war-as in connection with various lesser conflict
since-a majority in Congress showed itself unwilling to end the fighting, in fact
quite willing (until the very end) to continue to fuel it, but at the same time quite
resourceful in scattering the landscape with rationalizations whereby it could
continue to claim that it wasn't really its war.
ELY, supra note 5, at 12.
14. Role of U.S. Armed Forces in the Post-Cold War World.- Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1994) (statement of Sen.
Byrd).
15. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a), 1544(b) (1988).
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ities in the reporting requirement. These ambiguities have made it possi-
ble for Presidents to claim compliance with the Resolution while leaving
unanswered the question whether the sixty-day time period has actually
been triggered.
Finally, the most controversial provision of the Resolution, the
sixty-day time limit, has become harder to justify as the mission of the
American military evolved over the last quarter century. In 1973, Amer-
ican forces were used less frequently as actual policemen. Recently, not
only in Haiti but also in Somalia and to a lesser extent in Bosnia, mem-
bers of the armed forces have been called upon to carry out missions
directed at establishing or preserving domestic civil order. In such situa-
tions the Resolution gives would-be adversaries an incentive to engage
American troops in firefights, with the hope that ensuing hostilities will
trigger the Resolution's reporting requirement and necessitate the with-
drawal of the forces within sixty days.' 6 If the provision is to be
retained, it should be harmonized with other legislation-not yet in
effect-governing U.S. participation in United Nations peace enforce-
ment operations. Such legislation should authorize U.S. participation in
a standing or stand-by force, set strict limits that ensure the respect of
constitutional requirements concerning the command structure, and
ensure that the United States pays only its fair share. 17
II.
In part as a consequence of these shortcomings in the Resolution,
representatives of the Executive Branch have continued to make extrav-
agant claims of constitutional power. Following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait, President Bush claimed power to prosecute hostilities against
Iraq without congressional approval, premised upon the contention that
it was within the President's sole power to determine what constitutes a
war. 8 If this claim were correct, a federal district court declared, "the
16. See Alice Love, Speech by Clinton Adviser Spurs New Talks on Reform Plans for War
Powers Resolution, ROLL CALL, Oct. 27, 1994, where National Security Adviser Anthony Lake
made this same point in a 1994 speech at Harvard University.
17. See Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring
1991, at 97-101; Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the
Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEo.
L.J. 1573, 1602 (1994).
18. At his Jan. 9, 1991 press conference, when asked whether he would go to war with Iraq if
Congress failed to provide authorization, President Bush said, "I don't think I need it." He
continued: "Secretary Cheney expressed it very well the other day. There are a lot of differences
of opinion on either side. But Saddam Hussein should be under no illusions. I believe I have the
constitutional authority-many attorneys having so advised me." Excerpts: The Great Debate on
War Powers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1991, at 26. Justice Department lawyers in the Dellums v. Bush
case argued that the President had the sole power to determine when military activity constitutes
1995]
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congressional power to declare war [would] be at the mercy of a seman-
tic decision by the Executive. Such an 'interpretation' would evade the
plain language of the Constitution, and it cannot stand." 9
Nonetheless, the Clinton administration repeated essentially the
same claim prior to the invasion of Haiti. Clinton objected to congres-
sional proposals to curb presidential power to use armed force in Haiti
and Somalia, saying "I would strenuously oppose such attempts to
encroach on the President's foreign policy powers. 2° Congressional
approval to invade Haiti was not required, he claimed. "Like my prede-
cessors of both parties," he said, "I have not agreed that I was constitu-
tionally mandated to get [approval]."'" Assistant Attorney General
Walter Dellinger, a respected legal scholar, contended that the invasion
would not be a "war" and that congressional approval was therefore not
required. 2 The invasion was also justified under the law, Dellinger
argued, because it "accorded with the sense of Congress" and "satisfied
the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. '23 Each of these con-
tentions will be examined in turn.
A.
Addressing the second argument first-the contention that Con-
gress effectively approved the Haiti invasion-it is constitutionally irrel-
evant whether the action "accorded with the sense of Congress," that is,
whether Congress expressed an opinion not inconsistent with the inva-
sion. The real issue, as Dellinger himself recognized, is whether Con-
gress authorized the invasion, prohibited the invasion, or remained
"war" for constitutional purposes. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (1990). The district
court rejected this argument. Id.
Professor Ely notes that "the debates preceding the votes in both houses, though truncated by
the eleventh-hour nature of the President's request, were among the most responsible within
memory." ELY, supra note 5, at 50. Given the way in which decisions to use military force have
been made "within memory" this could be read as faint praise. Professor Ely recognizes this when
he subsequently states that "it would be a clear mistake to conclude from the Desert Storm
authorization that from here on we can count on the president and Congress to do their
constitutional duties." Id.
Professor Ely provides a brief summary of some of the practical and constitutional problems
with the Gulf War. See id. at 50-52. For an extended discussion of these issues, see Glennon,
supra note 17.
19. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D.D.C. 1990).
20. Interview With Radio Reporters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2097 (Nov. 11, 1993).
21. The President's News Conference, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1616 (Aug. 3, 1994).
22. Letter from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to Sen. Robert Dole et al. (Sept.
27, 1994), in 140 CONG. REc. 140, at S14314 (1994) [hereinafter Dellinger Letter]. Professor
Dellinger signed a letter opposing President Bush's assertion of executive power prior to the war
against Iraq. Letter from Walter Dellinger et al. to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (Jan. 2, 1991), in
137 CONG. Rc. 6, at S128 (1991).
23. Dellinger Letter, 140 CONG. Rac. 6, at § 14314.
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silent.24 Dellinger in fact argued in the alternative that Congress had
either authorized the invasion or remained silent.25
Clearly Congress did not authorize the invasion. To summarize,
Dellinger's argument to the contrary is based, first, upon a nonbinding
prohibition limited only to one source of funds, the FY 1994 DoD
Appropriations Act,26 from which he infers congressional assent. Next,
Dellinger argues that congressional authorization follows from the
absence of a prohibition in the War Powers Resolution, even though the
Resolution itself says that such an absence implies nothing.27 Finally,
he utterly ignores a statutory provision (also in the War Powers Resolu-
tion) precluding such an inference from any law-precisely the sort of
authorization he infers from the Resolution.28
The FY 1994 DoD Appropriations Act contained a "sense of the
Congress" statement effectively saying that Congress believes funds
made available under that law-not under other laws, but only that
law-ought not be spent for military operations in Haiti unless the Pres-
ident made certain findings and reported them to Congress. 29 The Presi-
dent so found and so reported.30 Accordingly, it was (supposedly) no
longer the opinion of Congress that this particular pot of funds was off-
limits for funding an invasion of Haiti. This "not off-limits" opinion is
very different from a congressional opinion that the President should
invade Haiti, or from a congressional opinion that the President need not
get prior congressional approval if he wished to invade Haiti, or from a
congressional opinion that money made available under other statutes
should be seen as affirmatively authorized for an invasion of Haiti."
24. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
25. Dellinger Letter, 140 CONG. Rac. at § 14,314; see also Walter Dellinger, After the Cold
War: Presidential Power and the Use of Military Force, 50 U. MiAMi L. REv. 107 (1995).
26. See id.
27. War Powers Resolution § 8(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1988). Dellinger does not even
make the argument (at least, not in writing) that Professor Ely raises and promptly rejects in War
and Responsibility, namely that an earlier statute cannot trump a later statute. ELY, supra note 5,
at 129. The argument in favor of disregarding § 8(a) is that a past Congress can't keep a future
Congress from enacting an appropriations bill that will finance an unauthorized military action
without complying with the War Powers Resolution. Id. Professor Ely rightly identifies this
section as a "rule of construction" which a subsequent Congress can repeal at any time, but, in the
absence of such a repeal, it should be honored. Id.
28. War Powers Resolution § 8(d), 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d) (1988).
29. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8147(b), 107
Stat. 1474 (1993).
30. See Letter to Congressional Leaders in Haiti (Sept. 18, 1994), 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1801 (1994).
31. And it is very different from the inferences made from the act of appropriating funds to
conduct the war in Vietnam. Professor Ely points out that in 1965, Congress explicitly authorized
seven hundred million dollars for "military activities in southeast Asia." ELY, supra note 5, at 27.
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The operative equivalent of a nonapplicable, nonbinding prohibition, in
short, is not authorization. It is silence.
Similarly, Dellinger contends that the War Powers Resolution itself
"recognizes and presupposes" presidential power to introduce the armed
forces into hostilities in a situation such as that which developed in
Haiti.32 The reason, he suggests, is that the Resolution sets a sixty-day
time limit on the use of armed forces in hostilities, and it would not do
so unless the Resolution, at least implicitly, permitted such a use.33 But
a different interpretation is more logical. If Congress wished to take no
position on the underlying constitutionality of any such use, would the
Resolution not read precisely the way it does? Is it not possible that the
sponsors of the Resolution might have thought that they had the votes, in
1973, merely to limit certain activities without prohibiting them? Del-
linger assumes, dubiously, that the act of limitation constitutes an
implicit authorization of the conduct in question. In reality the Resolu-
tion in and of itself implies no judgment whatsoever with respect to the
permissibility of the underlying conduct at its inception.
In fact, of course, the sixty-day limitation does not exist "in and of
itself." The limitation exists in a statute that expressly provides that
nothing in it may be construed as granting any authority to the President
to use armed force that the President would not have had in its
absence. 34 In other words, Congress directs all interpreters of the Reso-
lution to assume its non-existence for purposes of answering the ques-
tion for which Dellinger relies upon its existence. Faced with explicit
instructions by Congress as to how the statute is to be interpreted, Del-
linger disregards those instructions and proceeds through guess-work to
devise his own canon of construction, tailored to the outcome he desires.
Lest there be the slightest doubt concerning the availability of the
Resolution, or any other statute, to be pressed into service as an authori-
zation for the use of force, the Resolution sets forth two specific condi-
tions that must obtain before such reliance is permissible. First, any
such law must specifically authorize the introduction of the armed forces
That same year, an additional $1.7 billion was appropriated. Id. The following year Congress
appropriated $4.8 billion. Id. at 28. No such affirmative appropriations of funds existed for the
U.S. invasion of Haiti.
32. Dellinger Letter, 140 CONG. REc. at S14314. As far as I am aware, this is the first time
that any administration, Democratic or Republican, has sought to bolster its claim for the use of
force by relying upon the Resolution.
33. Id.
34. State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer claimed this provision was invalid.
Professor Dellinger made no such claim in his opinion but did so orally at the symposium that
spawned these articles. For a discussion (and rejection) of the argument, see GLENNON, supra
note 4, at 100-02.
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into hostilities or likely hostilities.35 Second, such a law must expressly
refer to the War Powers Resolution.36 Neither the FY 1994 DoD Appro-
priations Act nor the Resolution contains anything approaching such
wording.
Accordingly, it is unconvincing to contend that the President was
authorized by Congress to invade Haiti. At best, Congress was silent.
At worst, the posture of Congress was opposition, as evinced by the
statement of congressional opinion in the War Powers Resolution that
the President's commander-in-chief powers "are exercised only pursuant
to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territo-
ries or possessions, or its armed forces."3 7 Clearly, none of these cir-
cumstances existed with respect to the invasion of Haiti, and the
provision is directly applicable to that invasion. Dellinger, so eager
elsewhere in his memorandum to give effect to a nonbinding congres-
sional opinion that is nonapplicable, here dismisses this sense-of-the-
Congress statement because it is either nonbinding or "incomplete, 38
i.e., because Congress was wrong in its view that the President lacks
sole power to stage a military operation such as the invasion of Haiti.
The President may have such power, but if he does, it cannot come from
either of the statutes that Dellinger cites. It must come from the
Constitution.
B.
The Constitution authorized the invasion of Haiti, Dellinger argues,
because the invasion was to take place with the consent of the "legiti-
mate government, and did not involve the risk of major or prolonged
hostilities or serious casualties to either the United States or Haiti. ''39
This is the first instance in modem times, to my knowledge, that any
Executive has provided a meaningful standard by which the scope of
sole presidential authority under the commander-in-chief clause might
be assessed. Most administrations have paid so little regard to the rule
of law that they have not deigned to let us in on the war powers "law"
under which they have purported to operate. Unfortunately, the test
proffered by this administration does not represent a reasonable inter-
pretation of the Constitution's grant of power to the President.
Dellinger's constitutional argument is partly valid, partly invalid,
35. War Powers Resolution § 8(a), 50 U.S.C. 1547(a) (1988).
36. Id.
37. War Powers Resolution § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. 1541(c) (1988).
38. Dellinger Letter, 140 Cong. Rec. S14314 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994).
39. Id.
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and partly irrelevant. It is valid to suggest that among the factors that
affect the constitutionality of a given use of force by the President are
the likely nature, scope, and duration of the putative hostilities. I hardly
have standing to suggest otherwise, having argued recently in Foreign
Affairs that the President is not precluded, constitutionally, from "minor
uses of force not directed at significant adversaries, or risking substantial
casualties or large-scale hostilities over a prolonged duration."40 The
case for constitutionality is indeed strengthened, therefore, if few mem-
bers of the U.S. armed forces are involved and if little loss of life is
likely. The case for constitutionality is strengthened if the operation is
defensive in nature, or is directed at rescue of endangered U.S. citizens
or military personnel located abroad. The case for constitutionality is
strengthened if the use of force is for a short, rather than a long, period
of time.
But these are not the only pertinent criteria for assessing constitu-
tionality. Indeed, a use of force can meet those criteria and still be
beyond the scope of the President's power without congressional author-
ization. For example, in its declining years, the Soviet Union seized an
American journalist, headquartered in Moscow, and accused him of
espionage. Suppose it were possible, with a quick, Entebbe-like military
operation, for American special forces to have freed the incarcerated
journalist with little or no likely loss of life. Most observers probably
would think-correctly, I believe-that the President would have been
precluded, constitutionally, from initiating use of force against the
Soviet Union. The reason is that the Constitution can be fairly read as
imposing a requirement of proportionality upon the use of force even
though that use is authorized ab initio.
Similarly, most observers read into the Constitution an "emer-
gency" requirement, i.e., a requirement that the President seek prior con-
gressional consent unless confronted with circumstances so exigent that
no time exists to seek such approval. Of course, this condition, like the
others discussed above, is necessary but not sufficient: the mere pres-
ence of an emergency, in and of itself, will not support the use of force
by the President alone. Among other things, the nature and magnitude
of the threat to American interests must be taken into account. It would
be one thing to use force without congressional approval upon warning
that Pearl Harbor was about to be attacked, but it would be quite another
to use it upon warning that Russia was about to attack Chechnya.
This emergency requirement-recognized by Congress in its refer-
ence to a "national emergency" in the War Powers Resolution 4"-is
40. Glennon, supra note 17, at 90.
41. War Powers Resolution § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1988).
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ignored altogether by Dellinger; and it is, most would agree, the require-
ment central to the invasion of Haiti. The possibility of an invasion was
discussed for months before it was actually launched.4 2  Nothing
occurred within the days or hours preceding "launch" that justified
immediate action. Congressional approval could easily have been
sought by the Clinton Administration. Why it was not sought is specula-
tive. Probably, Congress would have refused; possibly, the President
viewed this as a useful opportunity to show that he does not always take
the popular course, or that he is "tough enough" to use armed force, or
that he is receptive to the views of an often-ignored congressional cau-
cus. These are precisely the kinds of reasons, of course, that the Consti-
tution places the decision to go to war in the hands of Congress: it is
intolerable for a Chief Executive to place American military personnel at
risk to shore up waning political popularity, and if Congress approves,
executive motives are less suspect.4 3
Finally, it is a matter of the utmost inconsequence, constitutionally,
that the invasion was approved by the "legitimate" government of Haiti.
The breadth of the President's constitutional authority is not a function
of the preferences of Jean Jacques Aristide. As a matter of international
law, not constitutional law, the use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of a state is flatly impermissible. When
such use becomes permissible-as, for example, when a request is made
to use third-party force to forestall a military coup (as was done in the
Philippines)-the request for intervention must be made by the sitting
government, assuming that it is actually in control of its territory and
population, and not by some entity that can be recognized or der-
ecognized by a would-be intervenor wholly at its whim. In the face of
congressional silence, the illegality of a military initiative under interna-
tional law implies illegality under U.S. domestic law as well, for interna-
tional law, as the Supreme Court has said, "is part of our law."44
42. As early as October 1993, almost a fill year before the actual invasion took place,
government officials acknowledged that the use of American armed forces was being considered.
Carla A. Robbins, U.S. Officials Say Restoring Democracy In Haiti May Require Military
Invasion, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at A18. Indeed, the often asserted need for surprise in
military actions was of no concern in the invasion of Haiti; the Clinton administration
intentionally "telegraph[ed] its punch" to try to force the military junta out. Michael R. Gordon,
U.S. Hopes Talk of War Forces Out Haiti Army, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1994, at Sect. 1, p. 4.
43. In a "confidential" memorandum to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the
UN special representative to Haiti reported that Clinton's aides saw political advantage in an
invasion that would demonstrate "the President's decision making capability and the firmness of
leadership in international political matters." The document was entered in the Congressional
Record. 140 CONG. REc. H6433 (daily ed. July 28, 1994) (Memorandum from U.N. Special
Envoy Dante Caputo).
44. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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III.
Congressional critics of the Haiti operation, serious in the belief
that it was beyond the President's constitutional power, would support,
it would seem, legislative measures to make effective their own ability
to check the abuse of presidential war power.45 This was, of course, the
purpose of the War Powers Resolution: it was aimed at facilitating the
task of Congress in checking presidential abuses of the power to make
war. As Senator J. William Fulbright wrote when the Resolution was
reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Resolution
should not be necessary, but it is necessary. The poor handling of the
Haiti operation, which could have cost many lives, Haitian as well as
American, sadly reveals that, twenty years later, legislation facilitating
congressional involvement is still necessary.
For the reasons discussed above, the War Powers Resolution has
failed in that task. But it can be made to work, as many commentators
have pointed out.4 6 The steps that need to be taken are readily identifi-
able and a remarkable level of consensus exists. Many of those refine-
ments are included in Sen. Joseph Biden's "Use of Force Act,"
introduced in March, 1995 and in War and Responsibility.4 7 The term
"hostilities" should be defined. The consultation requirement needs to
45. Nonetheless, many of those same critics propose repeal of the War Powers Resolution
because it impinges upon presidential power-presidential power that they have little hesitancy in
impinging when it comes to presidential authority to permit the use of U.S. troops in UN
peacekeeping operations. See 141 CONG. REc. S522 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Nickels) (stating Peace Powers Act will limit President's power to place U.S. troops under foreign
command); 141 CONG. REc. S1O (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating same).
Sen. Dole supported the War Powers Resolution in 1973 but now supports its repeal. Id.
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), in a speech reiterating his view that the War Powers Resolution is
unconstitutional, proposed legislation that would, in his words, "limit the placement of U.S. troops
under U.N. command unless it is vital to U.S. national security interests." See Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Hearing, supra note 1 (statement of Sen. Helms). He did not explain how
Congress is authorized constitutionally to control peacetime deployments of the armed forces but
not to control their introduction into hostilities.
46. See, e.g., Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); ELY, supra note 5; GLENNON,
supra note 4, at 71-122; Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch II1, The Treaty Power: Upholding A
Constitutional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1989); Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch
III, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A "Joint Decision" Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367
(1988); John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 1379 (1988); John H. Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I: The (Troubled)
Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 925-26 (1990); John H.
Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part 11: The Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't
Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1136-37 (1990); Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and
the Political Question Doctrine, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 814 (1989); Michael J. Glennon, Comment:
Mr. Sofaer's War Powers "Partnership", 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 584 (1986); Michael J. Glennon, The
War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics Than Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 571
(1984).
47. S. 564, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); ELY, supra note 5, at 115-38.
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be sharpened. Ambiguities in the reporting requirement should be elimi-
nated. The list of instances where sole presidential power is permissible
should be expanded and made binding, preferably with mandatory fund-
ing cut-offs. The Resolution should be made judicially enforceable.
And a number of other improvements should be made.4"
But they will not be. The current wisdom, in Congress49 as well as
the Executive Branch,50 is not that the Resolution should be beefed up
but that it should be repealed. 1 I am aware that others, predisposed as I
am toward broad congressional checks on presidential warmaking
power, have argued that some benefit inheres in keeping the Resolution
on the books, its flaws notwithstanding. The Resolution, it is said,
deters at least some unwanted executive behavior, and in any event
requires the Executive to justify its acts. Further, it is unlikely that
another opportunity will arise in which Congress will be able to muster
the political will to enact checks on executive abuses of the power to
make war.
There is more than a little truth in these suggestions, and it might
be useful to examine them more closely if repeal is ever seriously con-
templated by Congress. It would be interesting to know, for example,
precisely what role the Resolution played in internal executive branch
deliberations preceding the invasions of Panama, Grenada, and Haiti, or
prosecution of the Gulf War. My impression is, not much; Presidents
48. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 4, at 113-21.
49. Repeal of the War Powers Resolution is the principal objective of pending legislation. In
the Senate, the bill is S. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the "Peace Powers Act." In the House, it
is H.R. 7, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the "National Security Revitalization Act."
50. In 1994, the Clinton Administration announced support for repeal of the sixty-day time
period. David J. Scheffer, Introductory Note to United States: Administration Policy on
Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 33 Iwr'L LEGAL MATERIAL 795 (1994). This was
reaffirmed by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake in a speech at the Harvard University
Center for International Affairs. Thomas W. Lippman, White House Seeks Talks on War Powers;
Clinton Aide Calls for End of Fight Between Branches, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1994, at A12
(reporting on Lake's Harvard speech).
51. Some members, of course, continue to find that the Resolution provides useful cover. The
Washington Post reported on the reaction in Congress following National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake's speech calling for its evisceration:
"The question this body must face is whether or not to repeal the [W]ar [P]owers
[A]ct because it has no meaning whatsoever," Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.)
said during that debate. "Every president has viewed it as unconstitutional." But
other members said the measure is useful because it allows members to appear to be
asserting their prerogatives without having to decide anything substantive, as they
would if they had to vote on a measure to cut off funding for a military deployment.
Lippman, supra note 50, at A12.
It is disingenuous, I think, for representatives of this administration to claim that it does not
support repeal of the Resolution. The Byrd, Nunn, Warner proposal, which the Administration
supports, would gut the Resolution by repealing the sixty-day time period. For a discussion of this
proposal, see GLENNON, supra note 4, at 119-21.
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Reagan, Bush, and Clinton all seem to have done pretty much as they
pleased in those situations, and whatever checks came into play seemed
more political than legal. Still, executive officials have said that the
Resolution made them think about things that they would not otherwise
have considered. (Whether any action-or inaction-resulted from
such thought about those things is another question.)
My frustration with the Resolution, again, flows from the belief
that those benefits seem slight in comparison with its costs. Its "deter-
rent effect" is at best speculative; prior to the Gulf War, in Dellums v.
Bush,52 the congressional plaintiffs did not even argue that the executive
was constrained by the Resolution, probably because it was clear after
Lowry v. Reagan53 that the Resolution was judicially unenforceable.
The invasion of Haiti (like the invasions of Panama and Grenada) was
launched in the comfort of the apparent assumption that hostilities
would last less than sixty days. It is difficult to identify any instance in
which the Executive desired to undertake a military initiative but did not
because of the Resolution.
Finally, the improbability that Congress will again develop the
"mood" to enact a beefed-up Resolution strikes me as a reason to repeal
the Resolution rather than a reason to keep it. It is simply fanciful to
expect unquestioning governmental compliance with any law that says
government cannot do what it, on occasion, badly wants to do-espe-
cially when the law inevitably must speak in words that, given the sub-
ject matter, are ambiguous. Political will in Congress is a necessary
constant; if Congress lacks the backbone to confront the Executive, as
we saw too vividly in Dellums v. Bush,54 the courts will not likely do so.
What is needed is a realistic code regulating the use of force, a code
grounded upon an accurate assessment of the will to comply over time-
not simply at the moment of its enactment. As discussed above, the
Resolution fails that test. If the War Powers Resolution is not the flower
child of another era, it is at least seen to be; in a legal system increas-
ingly driven by the perceived consequences of violation rather than its
own long-term integrity, that is worse. But we must take the system as
we find it, and the reality is that the law's long-term integrity is under-
mined by what has become to the separation-of-powers what the old 55-
mile-an-hour speed limit became to driving.
I favor strengthening the Resolution over repealing it. But, if the
alternatives are the current version of the Resolution versus no Resolu-
tion, a hardheaded cost-benefit analysis is required. Many commenta-
52. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
53. 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
54. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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tors have sung the merits of a workable Resolution, but few have
examined the costs of the unworkable Resolution now in force, a Reso-
lution that does not yield the originally advertised benefits but which
does impose costs. Given the choice between no Resolution and one
that doesn't work-one, indeed, that confounds the congressional role
rather than strengthens it; one that confuses public attention rather than
focuses it; one that, with each use of force, deflects attention from
underlying policy considerations as well as constitutional questions; one
that gives the Congress no information about a crisis that it cannot get
from the New York Times; and one that has rendered the law irrele-
vant-the better choice is no Resolution. The costs of this Resolution
outweigh its benefits. It cannot politically be made to work, not because
the Clinton and Helms views are too far apart-they are virtually identi-
cal-but because the two are too far apart from Javits and Fulbright and
Madison and Jefferson.
The War Powers Resolution should be repealed."
55. One provision should be retained-one of the least noticed that has turned out to be the
most useful. That is the provision, discussed above, that tells the President and the courts that no
"implicit" statutory source of authority for use of force is available. This provision ruled out the
kind of inference made by Dellinger concerning Haiti. Congress did not authorize an invasion,
and Congress should not be seen as authorizing use of force unless that authorization is explicit, as
the Resolution requires.
Repeal at this point in time seems unlikely. On June 7, 1995, the House of Representatives
voted 217-201 against repeal of the War Powers Resolution. Forty-four Republicans defected to
vote in favor of the War Powers Resolution. The House Republican leadership claimed the
defections were caused by concerns about "giving President Clinton more authority during the
current Bosnia crisis." House Refuses to Lift Restriction on President's War Authority,
SACRAMENro BEE, June 8, 1995, at A4. House Speaker Gingrich was quoted as saying, "A
number of our members felt that on the edge of Bosnia, they didn't want to do something to
strengthen the president's hand." Id.
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